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Institutional Relationships and
Global Health
The institutional relationships that
exist in global health are a growing area
of inquiry. This has been most evident in
work examining corporate involvement
in health, because tensions can arise
between the profit motives of corpora-
tions and the promotion of public health.
Whereas corporations make products
that can improve health (such as phar-
maceuticals and vaccines) and relation-
ships between public health institutions
and for-profit corporations can be seen
as positive opportunities for corporations
to improve public health [1], corpora-
tions also make products that damage
health (such as tobacco or unhealthy
foods). And because some corporations
have a vested interest in the activities of
public health bodies, there have been
documented attempts to influence the
public health agenda by establishing
associations with health care institutions
[2].
The relationships of concern between
for-profit institutions and health-related
organizations can involve direct financ-
ing—such as when pharmaceutical com-
panies give gifts to physicians in a manner
that has been shown to increase prescrib-
ing of the promoted drugs [3,4]—or
indirect relationship-building, such as
when corporate staff or paid consultants
act as board members or strategic advisors
to health organizations. There are many
documented examples of corporate tactics
by the tobacco, mining, alcohol, asbestos,
food, and petrochemical industries aimed
at influencing public health promotion
(Table 1) [5–7].
In addition to examining corporate
relationships in the health arena, public
health advocates have also expressed
concerns about whether potential conflicts
of interests among state development aid
programs could negatively affect health
outcomes. Many government develop-
ment agencies act explicitly in the interests
of their own country [8–13]. This has
taken the form of conditionalities on
development aid and when aid is linked
to other political agendas such as reduced
tariffs or privatizing state-owned assets
[14,15]. Government aid has also been
criticized for causing unintended health
consequences—for example, by distorting
recipient government health budgets by
focusing on one or a few diseases at the
expense of others [16], by creating a
misalignment between health funding
and the observed burden of disease due
to external donations [17], and by inap-
propriately displacing government funds
that would have otherwise been invested
in health [18].
Institutional Conflicts of
Interests
When the agendas of institutions
working in global health coincide, rela-
tionships can bring health benefits. But
where agendas differ, a conflict of
interest may arise. Sometimes termed
‘‘competing interests,’’ conflicts of inter-
est have varying definitions. The strict,
legal meaning of ‘‘conflicts of interest’’
under US law is a situation in which
there is ‘‘a real or seeming incompatibil-
ity between one’s private interests and
one’s public or fiduciary duties’’ [19]. In
more popular usage, as set out in
Wikipedia, it is defined as when ‘‘an
individual or organization is involved in
multiple interests, one of which could
possibly corrupt the motivation for an act
in the other [italics in original]’’ [20].
Disclosure is an essential first step in
dealing with such potential conflicts [21],
but in some cases these are fundamen-
tally irreconcilable even with disclosure.
It can also be difficult to ascertain when
disclosure is only partial, as evidenced by
tobacco litigation that provided examples
of how it is possible to disclose some
truth, but not the whole truth, when it
came to declarations of conflicts of
interest [22]. Thus, the World Health
Organization (WHO) defines a potential
conflict of interest more broadly, as in its
guidelines for the Roll Back Malaria
(RBM) program:
A conflict of interest can occur when
a Partner’s ability to exercise judg-
ment in one role is impaired by his
or her obligations in another role or
by the existence of competing inter-
ests. Such situations create a risk of a
tendency towards bias in favor of
one interest over another or that the
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duties impartially and in the best
interest of the RBM Partnership.
A conflict of interest may exist even
if no unethical or improper act
results from it. It can create an
appearance of impropriety that can
undermine confidence in the indi-
vidual, his/her constituency or or-
ganization. Both actual and per-
ceived conflicts of interest can
undermine the reputation and work
of the Partnership. [23]
Global Health Foundations and
Potential Conflicts of Interest
While corporate involvement in and
government aid for health has been
extensively analyzed and critiqued in the
public health literature, less attention has
been paid to the impact of private donors
on public health [24]. Over the past
decade, the bulk of new health aid
designed to reach the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals has come from individuals
and corporations [25,26]. The influence of
this private philanthropy on global health
is profound and transformative [27].
Yet, it is intuitive that those who donate
money have a set of goals and objectives
that are of interest to them in making such
donations. Although the philanthropic
activities of wealthy individuals and cor-
porations have attracted controversy in the
past (Text S1), their charitable mission
often means that they face less scrutiny
than governments; critical analysis of
foundations can be seen as ‘‘biting the
hand that feeds us.’’ As a result, within the
global health community, private donors
are sometimes viewed as the ‘‘third rail’’
that no one wishes to analyze. However,
by virtue of not being subject to popular
elections, private foundations operate out-
side the typical boundaries of democracy;
unlike government ministries, private
foundations cannot be influenced in the
same way by the communities affected by
the foundations’ actions. In the interests of
public health, and particularly because
poor communities affected by foundations
do not automatically have a feedback
mechanism to influence the decisions of
private funders, we argue that it is
appropriate to subject private foundations
to the same scrutiny received by public
institutions.
In this paper, we examine the scope of
potential conflicts of interests that exist
among the private foundations that are
major funders of global health. We use the
WHO definition of potential conflicts of
interest, as detailed above. We conducted
a case study using data about the net-
works, activities, and funding patterns of
the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation,
Ford Foundation, W. K. Kellogg Founda-
tion, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation,
and Rockefeller Foundation, because these
are the largest private global health
foundations. We include an examination
of both the potential conflicts that may
arise in relation to these foundations’
overall activities and those of their indi-
vidual employees, which are already
typically covered by the foundations’
conflict of interest policies. We show that,
taken together, these conflicts of interest
can create complex situations whose
potential effects may be difficult to assess
in isolation.
Before proceeding with the findings of
our analysis, we first review the gover-
nance and regulations of private nonprofit
foundations.
Rules and Regulations Governing
Private Nonprofit Foundations
Nongovernmental, nonprofit organi-
zations operate under different rules
and regulations in each country. In the
United States’ common law system,
private foundations must qualify for
federal tax exemption. Unlike public
charities, they usually do not provide
services directly, but instead make grants
to other entities to fulfill the foundation’s
mission. Text S2 provides detailed infor-
mation about the rules and regulations
governing private foundations in the US;
most notably, private foundations must
not operate in a manner that benefits
private interests, particularly because
their tax exemption implies that their
work justifies forgoing the redistribution
of tax dollars from their private accounts
to public programs.
Private foundations may receive most
of their funds from a parent for-profit
corporation (such as PepsiCo Foundation)
or wealthy individuals and families (such
as the Doris Duke Foundation), some-
times in the form of investments (gifts of
stock) and cash endowments. Historically
some foundations have maintained sepa-
ration between management of their
endowments and grantmaking decisions
[28], although these practices and the
degree of separation vary across founda-
tions. Some foundations, like the Ford
Foundation, have investment committees
composed of members of the board of
directors. Others may manage foundation
investments externally or as a collabora-
tion of professional investment teams with
members of the board. In most cases, the
board of directors is responsible for
overseeing that funding decisions are
made according to a set of foundation
grant-making criteria. Again, practices
vary across foundations, as some have
governance committees, but typically
these criteria are set by the founders (in
some cases including the parent company)
and/or executive committee members,
donors, and overall boards of directors
of the foundations.
Summary Points
N Institutional relationships in global health are a growing area of study, but few
if any previous analyses have examined private foundations.
N Tax-exempt private foundations and for-profit corporations have increasingly
engaged in relationships that can influence global health.
N Using a case study of five of the largest private global health foundations, we
identify the scope of relationships between tax-exempt foundations and for-
profit corporations.
N Many public health foundations have associations with private food and
pharmaceutical corporations. In some instances, these corporations directly
benefit from foundation grants, and foundations in turn are invested in the
corporations to which they award these grants.
N Personnel move between food and drug industries and public health
foundations. Foundation board members and decision-makers also sit on the
boards of some for-profit corporations benefitting from their grants.
N While private foundations adopt standard disclosure protocols for employees to
mitigate potential conflicts of interests, these do not always apply to the overall
endowment investments of the foundations or to board membership
appointments. The extent and range of relationships between tax-exempt
foundations and for-profit corporations suggest that transparency or grant-
making recusal of employees alone may not be preventing potential conflicts of
interests between global health programs and their financing.
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itly designed to mitigate potential conflicts
of interest, the boundaries between foun-
dations, their investments, and their par-
ent corporations or private funders can
become blurred. Often, directors of the
boards of foundations also sit on the board
of private corporations, adopting multiple
roles. Thus, the Hilton Foundation has
‘‘an independent Board of Trustees and
Grants Committee comprised of indepen-
dent as well as senior Hilton personnel.
The Board of Trustees includes indepen-
dent members and Hilton members nom-
inated by the business’’ [29]. Although
practices vary across foundations, typically
the chief executive officer (CEO) of the
parent corporation appoints the executives
to the private foundation and has official
authority to influence funding decisions
through serving on the foundation board
[30]. However, while acting as a member
of the corporation’s board, the CEO, as
well as any other member of a corporate
board, has a legally binding fiduciary duty
to maximize shareholder profits for the
corporation. For this reason, until 1953,
US law prohibited companies from donat-
ing money to causes from which they did
not directly benefit [30].
To understand whether measures cur-
rently employed to prevent potential
conflicts of interest among private foun-
dations are sufficient to prevent an adverse
impact on public health, it is first necessary
to evaluate the scope of these potential
conflicts. Previous analyses of corporate
boards using power structure methods
have studied corporate philanthropy and
economic development organizations
[30,31,32,33], but to our knowledge such
analyses have yet to be applied to the area
of public health [24,27]. Here, we apply
these methods for the first time to study
major private funders of global health
programs.
Data and Methods
There are more than 100,000 private
nonprofit foundations operating in the US,
many of which contribute to global health
activities and research (holding about
US$569 billion in assets). Table 2 lists
the top US-based private foundations. Of
these, we chose the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation as a focus for detailed case-
study because it is the largest private
philanthropy in global health, with financ-
ing greater than the budget of the entire
WHO. For comparison, we chose the next
three wealthiest US private grant-making
foundations contributing to global health
funding: the Ford Foundation, the W. K.
Kellogg Foundation, and the Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation. Given the
Table 1. Selected examples of corporate strategies to influence public health promotion.
Strategy Selected Examples
Public relations Emphasize consumer’s personal responsibility, moderation, free choice, and pleasure.
Use the ‘‘government’’ versus ‘‘personal freedom and civil liberties’’ and ‘‘get government off our backs’’ arguments.
Vilify critics, health advocates and public health scientists as ‘‘health police’’ or ‘‘fascists’’ and accuse them of
seeking to impose a ‘‘nanny state.’’
Hire a public relations firm to develop and help carry out plans to create a favorable image, combat negative reports, or repair damage to
credibility or image.
Set up or fund ‘‘front groups’’ with consumer advocacy sounding names to promote the corporate agenda and messages.
Distortion of science Divert attention from health effects of their product or practices to other matters.
Publish journal articles and book chapters, make presentations at scientific meetings, host conferences and workshops for professionals
that give the appearance of objective science in order to convey an image of credibility, but do not present the entire dataset, or
misrepresent or distort data about the corporation’s harmful operations, products or policies.
Pay scientists or physicians or other professionals to serve as spokespersons to represent the corporation’s position.
Political influence Use lobbying to gain competitive advantage, avoid or minimize regulation and taxation.
Contribute funds to election campaigns of politicians in positions to influence legislation favorable to the corporation and to obtain
favorable rulings from the judiciary.
Participate as delegates in the policy-making or standard setting process to ensure the lowest or most lenient possible standards for
corporate products and operations.
Work to reduce government budgets for scientific, policy, and regulatory activities deemed contrary to the corporation’s profit.
Financial tactics Contribute funding to community and neighborhood organizations in order to create dependency, gain allies, and influence
or manipulate the organization’s agenda.
Set up or fund foundations that support the corporation’s agenda rather than funding priorities determined through independent
democratic processes (i.e., taxes).
Externalize as much cost as possible (e.g., dumping chemicals into rivers; not providing employee medical coverage).
Legal and regulatory
tactics
Work to get corporate officials or industry lobbyists appointed to governmental regulatory agencies with authority
over its own industry.
Shop for other judiciary venues or levels of government when rulings or decisions are unfavorable.
In regulatory or judicial matters, avoid as long as possible having a hearing on the facts.
When deemed necessary to ensure profits, employ illegal means.
Products and services Emphasize technological solutions to health problems to generate profit.
Use both direct advertising and indirect methods such as product placement and integration into the story line of entertainment venues.
Connect image of product or corporation with human emotions and values.
Sources: Adapted from [6,81].
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001020.t001
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Foundation in global health, we also
included it as a fifth comparator. While
our analysis is limited to these five
foundations, the methods applied here
can be extended to any other foundations
and their institutional affiliates. Our in-
tention is to provide an illustrative case
study for initial analysis of this subject.
In the sociology and political science
literature, aid organizations have typically
been studied by examining at least three
sets of observable questions about power
and financial relationships, with the intent
of ‘‘following the money’’ [33–39]: (i)
Where does money come from and with
what conditions?; (ii) Who decides? Who
sits on the board of directors, and what are
their histories, relationships, and interests?;
and (iii) Who benefits from these deci-
sions? Where are these funds distributed
and which entities derive income from that
expenditure? Related to decision-making
and control of the agenda, notions of ‘‘soft
power’’[40] and Lukes’ third dimension of
power [41] emphasize the importance of
power expressed not only through con-
crete, observable decisions and financial
flows but also in hidden and more subtle,
yet powerful, influences such as through
shaping perceptions, cognition, and pref-
erences, and influencing what is ‘‘kept
out’’ of agendas. This dimension of power
is arguably the most powerful; it is
ideological in nature and addresses how
decisions aremade by the foundationabout
what issues are funded and how (e.g., the
foundation will fund child health but not
HIV, or will fund programs in Africa but
not in Asia), and the cultural influence of
funders on the overall field to which the
philanthropy is being directed (e.g., em-
phasizing individual rather than collective
responsibility, or focusing on technological
interventions rather than indigenous ca-
pacity building). However, this dimension
of power is also more difficult to observe, as
it is indirect, informal, and may not be
made explicit [41,42]. Text S3 further
describes our sources of data used to
evaluate each component, including en-
dowment disclosures with the US Internal
Revenue Service and stock holdings with
the US Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC).
Comparative Analysis of
Leading US Global Health
Foundations
Where Does the Money Come From?
The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation’s
endowment mainly comes from Bill Gates’
personal fortune and stock in Berkshire
Hathaway given to the Foundation as a gift
from Hathaway’s CEO Warren Buffett. In
2006, Buffett made a pledge to gradually
give away all of his Berkshire Hathaway
stock to the Bill & Melinda Gates Founda-
tion, most recently with an additional 24.7
million shares in July 2010 [43]. Currently,
the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation is
listed with the SEC as a 10% owner of the
Berkshire company [44].
At the end of 2008, the Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation Trust had US$29.6
billion assets under its management: $13.5
billion were in corporate stock, $1.8 billion
in corporate bonds, $6.1 billion in US and
state government obligations, and $8.2
billion in other investments, land, and
temporary holdings [45].
As shown in Table 3, the Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation’s corporate stock endow-
ment is heavily invested in food and
pharmaceutical companies, directly and
indirectly (see Text S4 for full listings).
The Foundation holds significant shares in
McDonald’s (9.4 million shares represent-
ing about 5% of the Gates’ portfolio), and
Coca-Cola (.15 million shares, over 7% of
the Foundation’s portfolio, not counting
Berkshire Hathaway holdings). In 2009 the
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation sold
extensive pharmaceutical holdings in John-
son & Johnson (2.5 million shares), Scher-
ing-Plough Corporation (14.9 million
shares), Eli Lilly and Company (about 1
million shares), Merck & Co. (8.1 million
shares),andWyeth(3.7millionshares)[46].
About half of the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation’s stock holdings are already
invested in Berkshire Hathaway, a con-
glomerate holding company owning sev-
eral subsidiary companies, including
banks, railroads, candy production, retail,
and utilities. Thus, it is necessary to
examine the holdings of the Berkshire
company to analyze the Foundation’s
stock holdings. Berkshire Hathaway’s larg-
est investment is in Coca-Cola. It owns an
additional 8.7% of Coca-Cola (Warren
Buffett’s firm is the largest shareholder in
Coca-Cola, having stock worth .$10
billion dollars) and 6.3% of Kraft (Buffett
is also the largest shareholder of Kraft)
[47]. Berkshire Hathaway also has signif-
icant ownership in GlaxoSmithKline, Sa-
nofi-Aventis, Johnson & Johnson, and
Procter & Gamble, and is one of the main
global investors in the latter two pharma-
ceutical companies. Since Buffett is grad-
ually transferring ownership of Berkshire
Hathaway stock to the Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation [48], the Foundation
will soon be the largest stakeholder of
Coca-Cola and Kraft in the world.
Endowment investments in pharmaceu-
tical and food companies were similarly
observed among the Ford, Rockefeller, W.
K. Kellogg Foundation, and Robert Wood
Johnson Foundations [44,49–53]. The
invested companies included, to name a
few, Coca-Cola, Kellogg (a leading pro-
ducer of snacks and breakfast foods and
the main investment of Kellogg Founda-
tion), PepsiCo, Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline,
McDonald’s, Nestle (a company with
6,000 brands mainly in food and beverage
including coffee, water, chocolate, confec-
tionery, ice cream, ‘‘health-care nutri-
tion’’, and frozen foods, among others);
NovoNordisk, YumBrands (the world’s
largest restaurant company, operating
Pizza Hut, KFC [Kentucky Fried Chick-
en], and Taco Bell, among others),
Johnson & Johnson (main investment of
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation), and
Sanofi-Aventis, in addition to several min-
ing, petrochemical, and alcohol companies.
Table 2. Top five private foundations in the US, 2008.
Private Foundation Revenue (US$) Assets (US$)
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 3,760,987,546 29,673,548,843
Ford Foundation 817,196,296 11,045,127,839
J Paul Getty Trust 444,041,724 9,525,252,079
W K Kellogg Foundation 314,103,287 7,551,988,898
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 1,809,718,672 7,505,353,587
Source of data: Urban Institute, based on IRS 990-PF reports. Available at: http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/PubApps/nonprofit-overview-segment.php?t=pf.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001020.t002
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holdings in the tobacco company Lorillard
[44], while W.K. Kellogg and Rockefeller
foundations were indirectly invested in
tobacco corporations through conglomer-
ate equity funds such as Cedar Rock
Capital and Adage Capital Partners, re-
spectively. However, foundations may have
guidelinestoalign their investment portfolio
with their programmatic mission, such as
the Rockefeller Foundation’s ‘‘Social In-
vesting Guidelines’’ [54].
Bill and Melinda Gates, according to
their own statements, guide the managers
of the Foundation’s endowment, Cascade
Investment LLC (a private investment and
holding company controlled by Bill Gates
holding a 20% stake in Coca-Cola
FEMSA, a Coca-Cola bottling company,
in 2008 and a large stake in FEMSA, the
main bottling company of alcoholic and
soft drinks, especially in Mexico), and
regularly assess the endowment’s holdings.
As noted by the Foundation’s descriptionof
management practices, ‘‘When instructing
the investment managers, Bill and Melinda
also consider other issues beyond corporate
profits, including the values that drive the
foundation’swork.Theyhavedefined areas
in which the endowment will not invest,
such as companies whose profit model is
centrally tied to corporate activity that they
find egregious. This is why the endowment
does not invest in tobacco stocks.’’ The
Foundation had invested in Philip Morris
bonds prior to a New York Times report on
the matter in the year 2000 [28].
The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation
conflict of interest policy also sets out
guidelines for employees with stockhold-
ings [55], recognizing that ‘‘Holding a
financial interest in an organization does
not necessarily create a conflict of interest.
It will depend upon the facts and your role
as a foundation employee in selecting the
entity for the proposed transaction’’ and,
in particular, the policy states that ‘‘hold-
ing a financial interest in Berkshire Hath-
away or Microsoft does not necessarily
create a conflict of interest and there is no
need to disclose this information’’.
Who Decides?
The Ford Foundation has a mission
statement to ‘‘reduce poverty and injustice,
strengthen democratic values, promote
international cooperation, and advance
human achievement’’ [56]. The Rockefel-
ler Foundation also adopts a statement of
purpose, which on its founding specified
‘‘To promote the well-being of mankind
throughout the world,’’ and currently states
‘‘Today we apply this mission in the era of
globalization’’ [57]. Finally, the Bill &
Melinda Gates Foundation has no mission
statement but has 15 guiding principles (the
first is that it is ‘‘driven by the interests and
passions of the Gates family’’). Mr. Gates
also writes an annual letter, setting out the
Foundation’s agenda; the mostrecent states
that ‘‘overall we have about 30 innovations
we are backing. Although the list includes
onlyone new vaccine and one new seed, we
are funding vaccines for several diseases
(malaria, AIDS, tuberculosis, etc.) and new
seeds for many crops (corn, rice, wheat,
sorghum, etc.) …A few things we do, like
disaster relief and scholarships do not fit
thismodel,but over 90% of ourworkdoes’’
[58].
Like the other private foundations, the
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation does not
disclose the detailed discussions that take
place among its Board when funding
decisions are made, because of the need
to ensure free comment on grant applica-
tions. However, the Foundation’s detailed
policy on potential conflicts of interest for
its employees [55] states that an employee
Table 3. Summary of Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation stock portfolios, 2010.
Entity Holding Portfolio Rank US Dollars, Billion Portfolio Share Company Share
Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation Trust
Berkshire Hathaway 1 5.89 49.75% 3.19%
McDonald’s 2 0.62 5.21% 0.88%
Coca-Cola 4 0.51 4.31% 0.44%
Waste Management 5 0.49 4.15% 3.25%
Walmart 7 0.44 3.75% 0.13%
Coca-Cola FEMSA 9 0.35 2.97% 2.47%
Costco 10 0.34 2.83% 1.39%
Monsanto .20 0.02 0.19% 0.20%
Total — 11.85 — —
Berkshire Hathaway Coca Cola 1 10.0 21.58% 8.68%
Procter & Gamble 4 4.7 10.08% 2.75%
Kraft Foods 5 2.9 6.34% 6.03%
Johnson & Johnson 6 2.4 5.25% 1.50%
Walmart 7 1.9 4.04% 1.07%
Nestle 23 0.16 0.35% 0.09%
Sanofi-Aventis 29 0.12 0.26% 0.15%
GlaxoSmithKline 34 0.05 0.11% 0.06%
Total — 46.44 — —
Notes: (1) Because one-half of Gates endowment is held in Berkshire Hathaway, a figure which will rise in the future, we also report the holdings of Berkshire Hathaway.
Data retrieved from http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (accessed 30 June 2010). Company share calculated based on dividing number of shares held by total company
shares outstanding. See Text S4 for full listing of stock holdings. (2) The largest stock-related holding of Ford Foundation is in MFO capital international emerging
markets (,$400 million) and TCW strategic mortgages (,$490 million); of Rockefeller Foundation is in Adage Capital Partners (,$98 million); and of W. K. Kellogg is in
Kellogg stock, a producer of snack foods and cereals ($4.1 billion). Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s main stock holding reported to the SEC is in Johnson & Johnson,
valued at over $800 million.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001020.t003
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‘‘He or she or any member of his or her
family may receive a financial or other
significant benefit as a result of the
individual’s position at the foundation;
The individual has the opportunity to
influence the foundation’s granting, busi-
ness, administrative, or other material
decisions in a manner that leads to
personal gain or advantage; or The
individual has an existing or potential
financial or other significant interest which
impairs or might appear to impair the
individual’s independence in the discharge
of their responsibilities to the foundation.’’
The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation’s
management committee oversees all the
Foundation’s efforts (analogous to a board
of directors). The management committee
comprises three co-chairs (Bill Gates,
Melinda Gates, and William Gates Sr.);
three trustees (Bill and Melinda Gates and
Warren Buffett); a CEO (Jeff Raikes);
three presidents of its respective programs
in Global Development (Sylvia Mathews
Burwell), United States (Allan Golston),
Global Health (Tachi Yamada); chief
administrative (Martha Choe), financial
(Richard Henriques), human resources
(Franci Phelan), and communications offi-
cers (Kate James); a managing director of
public policy (Geoff Lamb); and a general
counsel and secretary leading the legal
team (Connie Collingsworth). Each pro-
gram has a leadership team, such as the
Global Health Leadership team, led by the
president of the program.
Several of the Foundation’s members of
the management committee, leadership
teams, affiliates, and major funders are
currently or were previously members of
the boards or executive branches of several
major food and pharmaceutical compa-
nies (see the commercial network of the
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation in the
interactive map tool at http://mapper.
nndb.com/start/?map=12051; see also
Figure S1 for more details), including
Coca-Cola, Merck, Novartis, General
Mills, Kraft, and Unilever (one of the
largest global consumer goods companies
owning product brands in food, beverage,
and personal and home care), among
others [59–62].
Given the important role of these board
members in shaping and approving grant
allocation decisions as well as the Foun-
dation’s strategic vision, the personal
histories of leading members of the board
were analyzed. The Foundation is de-
scribed as ‘‘led by CEO Jeff Raikes and
Co-chair William H. Gates Sr., under the
direction of Bill and Melinda Gates and
Warren Buffett.’’ Warren Buffett, the
second-largest donor to the Foundation
and a board member, was a member of
the board of Coca-Cola from 1989–2006
(Figure S1; his son, Howard Buffett, is on
the board of Coca-Cola Enterprises and
ConAgra Foods [one of North America’s
largest packaged food companies], which
is invested in modern seed technology, as
are other members of the board of
Berkshire Hathaway). Warren Buffett is
the chairman and CEO of Berkshire
Hathaway (and Bill Gates is a director
on its board). Jeff Raikes, who replaced
Patty Stonesifer in May 2008 (currently a
senior advisor to the trustees), retired as
the president of Microsoft business division
to join the Foundation. Both Raikes and
William Gates Sr. are on the board of
Costco Wholesale Corporation (a mem-
bership warehouse club, selling bulk-pack-
aged products at very high volume and
low prices—the third largest retailer in the
US).
Further overlaps between Bill & Me-
linda Gates Foundation leadership, other
private foundations, and circular flows of
personnel with food and pharmaceutical
companies were observed (Text S5). Such
patterns of interlinked board directorships,
common among corporations and non-
profit organizations, were similarly found
in the other private foundations studied.
The Gates Foundation conflict of inter-
est policy (as mentioned above) [55] notes
that in such cases of overlap, the employee
should disclose his/her position; refrain
from exercising decision-making authority
with respect to the grant and also with
helping the potential grantee with prepar-
ing or submitting proposals; and recuse
oneself from managing the grant. Further,
it notes that board members of other
organizations have fiduciary duties of care,
loyalty, and confidentiality to those orga-
nizations, which require directors to act in
accordance with the best interest of the
organization on whose board the director
serves, irrespective of the other entities
with which the director is affiliated. Where
recusal is not possible, the policy states that
‘‘you should document that your manager
at the foundation has approved any final
decisions with respect to the foundation’s
grant to the organization.’’
Who Benefits? Where Does the
Money Go?
The bulk of the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation’s financial transfers in global
health have been to programs developing
medical technologies [24]: more than 97%
of its financial disbursements are directed
to infectious diseases, and less than 3% to
chronic noncommunicable diseases [16].
The majority of the Foundation’s grants
are directed to researchers in the US. Of
US$9 billion in financial transactions that
went toward 1,094 global health programs
between 1998 and 2007, about half went
to recipients in the US and 40% to
supranational organisations; overall, about
42% of all funding was spent on health
care delivery or increasing access to drugs,
vaccines, and medical commodities, while
an additional one-third was allocated to
technology development (mainly for vac-
cines and microbicides) or basic science
research [24].
Several grants are linked to companies
that are represented on the Foundation’s
board among its investments. The Foun-
dation has established partnerships with
the Coca-Cola Company, which, in the
words of the Foundation, are intended to
‘‘create new market opportunities for local
farmers whose fruit will be used for Coca-
Cola’s locally-produced and sold fruit
juices’’ [63]. The program is a four-year,
$11.5 million partnership for ‘‘mango and
passion fruit farmers to participate in
Coca-Cola’s supply chain for the first
time,’’ with a $7.5 million grant provided
by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation to
TechnoServe, $3 million provided by The
Coca-Cola Company, and $1 million by
bottling partner Coca-Cola Sabco. This
could reflect the recent comments of
Melinda Gates in a webcast, ‘‘What we
can learn from Coke,’’ suggesting that
government agencies and nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGOs) could learn from
the manufacturer to promote global health
in low- and middle-income countries [64].
In addition, many of the Foundation’s
pharmaceutical development grants may
benefit leading pharmaceutical companies
such as Merck and GlaxoSmithKline [24],
for example via partnerships to test
pneumonia and rotavirus vaccines (such
as the ROTATEQ partnership and the
Merck Vaccines network partnership with
the Global Alliance for Vaccines and
Immunizations network), experimental
malaria vaccines (through Medicines for
Malaria Venture, an NGO), cervical
cancer vaccines (through PATH, an
NGO, and Merck’s vaccine Gardasil),
and HIV interventions (through the Africa
Comprehensive HIV/AIDS partnership).
Johnson & Johnson has entered a clinical
partnership to develop new HIV-preven-
tion technology, noting ‘‘the work between
Johnson & Johnson and the Gates Foun-
dation is a strong, strategic, comprehen-
sive relationship’’ [65].
The Foundation has also funded initia-
tives that are not obviously linked to
corporations, such as those for health
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burdens. It invested $105 million to create
the Institute for Health Metrics and
Evaluation at the University of Washing-
ton, which is led by one of the leading
researchers responsible for the Global
Burden of Disease Study (one of the most
widely used datasets in global health) and
has now become a leading institution for
estimating global mortality and disability
rates. The Foundation is also one of the
largest donors to the WHO, giving sums
that amount to about 4% of WHO’s
overall budget (,$150 million) [17].
Discussion
Here, we have observed that five major
US private nonprofit foundations have
significant investments in food and/or
pharmaceutical companies, directors who
currently or have previously sat on the
boards of those companies, and, in several
cases, enter in partnerships with those
companies. Our analysis focused mainly
on the potential conflicts of interests
among the largest foundation, the Bill &
Melinda Gates Foundation. As one exam-
ple, we found that Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation has substantial holdings in the
Coca-Cola Corporation, and also partici-
pates in grants that encourage communi-
ties in developing countries to become
business affiliates of Coca-Cola. It has
been noted by some commentators that
sugary drinks such as those produced by
Coca-Cola are correlated with the rapid
increase in obesity and diabetes in devel-
oping countries [66]. Noncommunicable
diseases constitute more than half of all
deaths in low- and middle-income coun-
tries [67], while the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation, along with the World Bank
and national official development aid
donors, have been criticized for directing
less than 3% of their collective budgets
toward these conditions [16,24,68]. Simi-
lar potential conflicts of interests were
observed among other leading global
health nonprofit foundations, including
the Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foun-
dation, Robert Wood Johnson Founda-
tion, and W.K. Kellogg Foundation.
Before assessing the implications of
these findings, important limitations of
our study must be addressed. First, as with
all studies into the sociology of institutions
[37,39], we can observe the flows of
funding and interlocking members of
different institutions, but we cannot assess
whether these associations resulted in a
particular decision taking place. At a
minimum, our observations indicate that
some of the same people who participate
on the boards of major multinational
pharmaceutical and food corporations
are also linked to the managerial boards
of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.
Second, the situation changes rapidly as,
in the case of investment holdings, the
information provided is already dated at
the time of this communication given daily
changes in stock portfolios. Third, map-
ping the institutional relationships between
representatives of boards of directors and
their other affiliations is a complex task
and, to our knowledge, no standardized
dataset exists for this purpose. Thus, it is
possible that the links we demonstrate in
Figure S1 are not exhaustive and that
several links we report pre-date the year
2008. Fourth, we have focused our
attention on private foundations given
the dearth of prior academic analyses in
this realm. However, nonprofit organiza-
tions and universities have also been
accused of bias against the private sector,
with ideologically driven critiques and
financial connections that favor govern-
ment-based bureaucracies (although cor-
porate leaders sit on the boards of major
US universities) [69]. Similarly, influence
is not unidirectional from corporations to
nonprofit bodies; the latter can influence
corporations in the many modes of
‘‘corporate philanthropy’’ and social re-
sponsibility. Hence, our focus of analysis
on private institutions does not provide a
comprehensive review of the types of
interactions and interests that can exist in
the global health sphere. Finally, our
analysis has also not addressed the poten-
tial for conflicts of interest to arise with the
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation’s grants
related to the agricultural sector and
investments in seed technologies, pesti-
cides, and genetically modified organisms
in connection with Monsanto (in which
the Foundation holds stock and with
which it supports joint grants through the
African Agricultural Technology Founda-
tion that may benefit the company) as well
as the Foundation’s stock holdings in oil
companies, such as ExxonMobil and
British Petroleum, that have been linked
to environmental and health crises in the
Niger Delta and other regions [70].
A private foundation clearly has the
legal right to spend money however it
wishes within the limits of the law; yet, in
an environment where private foundations
influence the future direction of, for
example, what programs will be intro-
duced into a foreign community, in a
manner that does not necessarily involve
directorship or voting from the community
members themselves, it is reasonable to
subject the decision-making processes of
these entities to public debate, especially if
these funds were to have otherwise been
collected for public redistribution through
federal taxation.
Several strategies may help mitigate the
potential for conflicts of interests in private
foundations to negatively impact global
health decision-making (also Box 1):
(1) Divestment
Private foundations have been advised
to not invest in companies that stand to
profit from the tax-exempt foundation’s
agenda or in those that produce products
such as tobacco, salty foods, or sugary
drinks that have well-established connec-
tions to global health epidemics [71]. Such
investments may counter these founda-
tions’ purposes of promoting global health.
Similarly, foundations must be wary about
investing in pharmaceutical and food and
beverage companies that could gain mar-
ket share and enhanced publicity, and
could benefit as a result of the foundation’s
grants. For example, the Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation held stock in Merck at a
time when it developed partnerships with
the African Comprehensive AIDS and
Malaria Partnership and the Merck Com-
pany Foundation to test Merck products.
As another instance, which may reflect
aligning interests, the Robert Wood John-
son Foundation has played a leading role
in promoting anti-tobacco products and
maintains Smoking Cessation Leadership
Centers and programs [72], although its
endowment is mainly invested in Johnson
& Johnson, a leading manufacturer of
cessation products, and some board mem-
bers have been represented on both the
Foundation’s and the company’s boards
[53].
(2) Transparency
Given that there is a limited pool of
specialist expertise that can be drawn
upon, it is possible that situations may
arise where some persons who sit on the
boards of, or advise, philanthropic foun-
dations, will also have links to corpora-
tions. It would be unreasonable to demand
that foundations refuse to engage with
those who have corporate links, so denying
themselves the best advice in some fields.
Many authors have stated that a solution
to this issue is to adopt full disclosure, or
transparency, and to ensure that all
individuals on foundation boards recuse
themselves from decisions related to their
affiliate companies [16]. However, achiev-
ing transparency and appropriate recusals
is not always easy. Indeed, while the
information we collected to conduct this
case study is all in the public domain (and
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time and effort to assemble in a manner
that can be publicly interpreted, thus
limiting full transparency. Furthermore,
there is an inevitable time lag between
decisions being made and information on
the relationships among those making the
decisions becoming available, which again
limits transparency. Nevertheless this case
study sets out the type of information that
is required for observers to interpret global
health financial flows and, we argue, offers
a template for future disclosures to en-
hance transparency of not just individual
employees but the full scope of potential
conflicts of entire institutions.
(3) Aligning Aid with Community
Needs
It is important to align aid with
community needs. However, despite nu-
merous declarations to align aid with the
preventable burden of disease, private
foundations tend to operate in ‘‘silos,’’
focused on a core set of issues that their
founder or governing director decides is
important [73]. Extra-budgetary contribu-
tions, earmarked by donors, are a major
factor in creating the observed imbalance
between patterns of expenditure by global
health institutions and the current burden
of disease [17].
Major funders can have a significant
impact on overall financial flows; Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) economists are
advising that countries divert aid to reserves
because ofconcerns about its unreliable and
unpredictable nature, and the desire to
privatize health care services rather than
perpetuate state-run health care operations
[74,75]. A recent study found that when
countriesareborrowingfromtheIMFmore
than 98% of aid is diverted to reserves or
displacing government spending on health
[75]. Working toward global health financ-
ing that aligns with the disease burden will
remain elusive if foundations and financial
institutions operate as distinct bodies while
influencing communities that are receiving
numerous disparate and poorly coordinated
funds. Thus, foundation investment and
program portfolios should incorporate rep-
resentation from the intended recipients of
its support.
Conclusion
The question of whether and how
financial and institutional relationships
might shape foundation decision-making
has yet to be answered, and continues to
be a point of controversy. To draw a
recent example, if a Chinese businessper-
son invested in the Chinese auto industry
were to donate to the Hurricane Katrina
relief efforts in New Orleans, such a
donation would no doubt be welcomed;
if the donation, however, was conditional
upon renovating New Orleans9 factories to
produce products for the Chinese auto
industry, such a program may produce
legitimate debate. Analogously, when the
Gates Foundation is heavily invested in
Coca-Cola and simultaneously works to
orient developing country farmers towards
production for Coca-Cola instead of
alternative development strategies, such
an approach has potential consequences
for grant-receiving communities and their
health [21,76–79].
Potential conflicts of interest exist ev-
erywhere, but there is considerable varia-
tion in how they are managed. When such
topics have been discussed in the medical
literature in the past, they have resulted in
the avoidance of disastrous outcomes—
such as the revelation that major biomed-
ical research was inappropriately analyzed
to support drug marketing by academics
influenced by the pharmaceutical industry
[80]. The overarching challenge is to
prevent these potential interests from
distorting science and public health out-
comes.
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Box 1. Strategies for Mitigating Conflicts of Interest
1. Divestment: Investments should not counteract the foundation’s charitable
mission statement and objectives in either a real or a perceived way. There should
be separation between investment management and the foundation’s board. It is
also possible to create a ‘‘blind trust’’ so that the foundation leaders are not aware
of their corporate investments and avoids the possibility that investment
knowledge influences program decisions.
2. Transparency: Full disclosure of actual or potential conflicts of interest is
necessary in making public health decisions. This includes disclosing corporate
affiliations (directorships, advisory panels, funding receipt) and personal
investment holdings. When board members and their friends and relatives stand
to be directly affected by grant decisions, they should recuse themselves from the
discussion and decision. Members may also resign from corporate boards and sell
stock (or create a blind trust, as described above). Independent audits can also
routinely monitor the scope and management of potential conflicts of interest
within private foundations. A widely shared and monitored public health code of
ethics could provide guidance to mitigate conflicts of interest at foundations from
adversely influencing practice.
3. Alignment of aid with community needs: Foundation investment and
program portfolios should incorporate representation from the intended
recipients of its support.
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